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COMMENTS
THE VENDOR-PURCHASER RELATIONSHIP
IN WASHINGTON
STUART G. OLES

The persistence with which our court clings to the unfortunate language of the leading case of Ashford v. Reese' has given rise to considerable confusion in the local practice. This comment is written
with the hope that it may aid in dispelling that confusion.
The overwhelming weight of authority in this country has been to
the effect that the vendee under an executory contract to purchase land
is the equitable owner.2 The early cases in this jurisdiction adhered
closely to the prevailing view,3 which in essence simply states the

1132

Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925)
'55 Amw. JUn., Vendor and Purchaser,782, § 356.
' Hyde v Heller, 10 Wash. 586, 39 Pac. 249 (1895) Griggs Land Co. v. Smith.
46 Wash. 185, 89 Pac. 477 (1907) Davie v Davie, 47 Wash. 231, 91 Pac. 950
(1907)

COMMENT
eminently practical attitude that such a vendee has certain equities in
the land which should be protected. It should be noted that this elementary doctrine is not properly synonymous with that of "equitable
conversion." The latter is an attempt to systematize the doctrine of
equitable ownership by considering the contract of purchase as a
magical rite which converts the vendor's interest into personalty and
the purchaser's interest into realty Like many legal fictions this one
is open to over-literal interpretation. Thus Lord Eldon employed the
fiction to place the risk of loss of the property on the purchaser where
the loss occurs subsequent to the execution of the contract.' This heavyhanded application of the "equitable conversion" doctrine is generally
the law today, and frequently a purchaser finds himself compelled to
specifically perform his obligations under a contract for subject matter
which has been partially or wholly destroyed.
A minority of jurisdiction has stood out against the rigor of Lord
Eldon's rule and has placed the risk of loss on the vendor, basing this
result on a variety of plausible grounds.' A number of legal writers
welcome the increasing strength of this minority as an intelligent
swing of the pendulum away from the often unjust working of the
strict "equitable conversion" doctrine. But it remained for the Washington court to unfnnge thependulum altogether. In Askford v. Reese'
the purchaser sought to rescind a contract to buy a building and lot,
the building having been destroyed by fire through no fault of the
parties. The contract contained the usual clauses for notice and forfeiture in case of default by the purchaser and was largely executory
at the time of litigation. The court found for the purchaser, asserting
that.the risk of loss must fall on the party holding title at the time of
loss. To this extent the decision is in accord with the minority jurisdictions, but the court went on to say that the purchaser under any
executory contract has "no title or interest, either legal or equitable."
In effect, the entire doctrine of equitable ownership was discarded;
whereas other jurisdictions had arrived at the same result with regard
to fixing the risk of loss, without major dislocations of the substantive
law, our court found it necessary to sacrifice a deeply embedded and
valuable concept upon which is based a considerable part of our
property law.
'Paine v. Mefler, 6 Ves. 349, 81 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1801)
5Libman v. Levenson, 286 Mass. 221, 128 N. E. 13 (1920)
1243.

' See note 1 supra.

See 101 A. L. R.
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The Washington court was of course unable to cite cases from other
jurisdictions to support this revolutionary holding and was forced to
rely on certain previous Washington cases. As pointed out at the time,
these cases grew out of unsupported dicta in early decisions This
jurisdiction has remained raraaws with regard to the Ashford language
and it is still impossible to find elsewhere any holdings squarely in
accord with the principal case.
The Ashford case has been quite thoroughly dissected in previous
Washington Law Review articles and notes.' We shall here confine
ourselves to a summary of the decisions subsequent to the principal
case. This summary, it is hoped, will delineate the present state of
the law with regard to the vendor-purchaser relationship. It is also
anticipated that it will clearly indicate that Ashford v. Reese, insofar
as it rejected the doctrine of equitable ownership, is no longer the law
in Washington.
The granting of specific performance to a purchaser upon the default
of the vendor is in itself a recognition of the purchaser's special equities
in the land. There is a certain logical inconsistency in recognizing the
purchaser's right to specificially enforce the transfer of legal title and
at the same time claiming that the purchaser has no "interest, either
legal or equitable" in the land. By any practical definition the right
to specific performance endows the purchaser with an "interest", yet
our court has never applied the Ashford reasomng to deny specific
performance to the purchaser.9 Moreover our court has been liberal
in granting to the purchaser a period of grace before foreclosure by the
vendor will be allowed.' 0 The decisions to this effect have been supported by citations from foreign jurisdictions and there can be little
"Dissent in Ashford v. Reese, supra note 1.
8 Lichty, Rights and Estates of Vendor and Vendee Under an Executory Contract for the Sale of Real Property (1925) 1 WAsH. L. REV. 9; Schweppe, Rights
of a Vendee Under an Executory Forfeitable Contract for the Purchase of Real
Estate: A Further Word on the Washtngton Law (1926) 2 WASH. L. REV. 1; Lantz,
Rights of Vendees Under Executory Contracts of Sale (1928) 3 WASH. L. Rav. 1;
Schweppe, The New Forfeitable Clause Test %n Executory Contracts for the Sale

of Real Estate (1928) 3 WASH. L. REv. 80; etc.

Pratt v. Rhodes 142 Wash. 411, 253 Pac. 640 (1927) Dysart v. Colonial Fire
Underwriters, 142 Wash. 601, 254 Pac. 240 (1927), Vandin v. McCleary Timber
Co., 157 Wash. 635, 289 Pac. 1016 (1930)
10 Zane v. Hinds, 136 Wash. 352, 240 Pac. 6
625, 282 Pac. 928 (1929); Roy Investment Co.
403 (1930), Grosgebauer v. Schneider, 177
Central Life Assurance Soc. v Impelmans, 13
Dill v. Zielke, 126 Wash. Dec. 233 (1946)

(1925), Wallis v. Elliott, 154 Wash.
v. Holmes, 159 Wash. 244, 292 Pac.
Wash. 282, 31 P (2d) 901 (1934),
Wn. (2d) 632, 126 P (2d) 757 (1942)
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doubt that the abhorrence of strict foreclosure is common with most
courts. Our court, it would seem, fails to recogmze that the basis of
this abhorrence is, fundamentally, the doctrine of equitable owner1
ship.
As a result, then, of the court's attitude towards granting specific
performance and periods of grace to the purchaser, it seems clear that
there has been no eagerness to apply the Ashford language rigorously
Tins lack of eagerness has been further exemplified by subsequent cases
which have purposefully and arbitrarily limited the application of the
Ashford case. It has been held that after the purchaser has fully
performed his part of the bargain he acquires complete equitable title. 2
It would be difficult to explain why one who has paid all the purchase
price should be held to be the equitable owner whereas one who has
paid all but one or two instalments, for example, should be held to have
no "interest, either legal or equitable." The distinction can be rationalized only by assuming that our court has begun to regret the Ashford
language and has seen the necessity of sharply limiting it.
An even more arbitrary distinction has been made between those
contracts winch include a forfeiture clause and those winch do not.
It has been held that the Ashford doctrine is only applicable in the
former situation; that is, the purchaser is equitable owner in the
absence of a forfeiture clause. 3 The leading case for tins position is
based on various early Wasinngton cases, winch are of course no real
authority because they arose at a time when all contracts to sell land
transferred equitable ownersinp. Since most real estate contracts
include forfeiture clauses as a matter of course, the distinction is of
little practical importance, but it clearly indicates the almost frantic
attempt of our court to confine the Ashford doctrine.
Not even in the risk of loss situation has our court stood firmly on
the Ashford case. If the vendor has the whole legal and equitable title
in the land, as the Ashford doctrine clearly implies, it should logically
follow that the entire proceeds of a fire insurance policy taken out in
his name should accrue to him alone in event of loss occurring prior
to the date of performance set for the contract. But the Washington
court has said that the vendor is only entitled to the proceeds to the
1 Pound, Progress of the Law (1920) 33 HAAv. L. REv, 813.
22 Pratt v. Rhodes, 142 Wash. 411, 253 Pac. 640 (1927), cited supra note 9.
"8 Aylward v. Lally, 147 Wash. 29, 264 Pac. 983 (1928); First National Bank
v. Mapson, 181 Wash. 196, 42 P (2d) 782 (1935), Dean v. Woodruff, 200 Wash.
166, 93 P (2d) 357 (1939)
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extent of the payments due him under the contract." The implication
is that the vendor has only a security interest in the land, a sharp
contradiction of the Ashford rule. Yet the court has continued to pay
allegiance to the latter, apparently failing to see the inconsistency of
its position."
There are other situations in which the court has arrived at results
that are inconsistent with the doctrine that the vendor has more than
a security interest in the land. It has been held that a creditor of the
vendor cannot attach more than the vendor's interest in the land-that
is, the amount of the payments due from the purchaser." The court has
also held that the vendor's interest is personalty for purposes of administration." This is the precise situation for which the "equitable conversion" theory was originally developed by Lord Eldon, and our court
seems to apply the theory in its usual form. 8 That this is in opposition
to the Ashford case almost goes without saying, but what renders the
holding more remarkable is that the citations used as authority by the
court are those early Washington cases which were overruled by the
Ashford case! A like situation is presented by the view in our state
that a vendor's interest, where the vendor is out of the state, is not
taxable under the inheritance tax. 9 The court's reasoning is that the
vendor's interest is intangible personal property having its situs at the
vendor's place of residence and hence is outside of the state's jurisdiction. If this argument be compared with the language of Ashford v
Reese we are confronted by the anomalous proposition that the purchaser has no interest whatsoever, and the vendor has only a personal
interest; the real property interest which remains floats about in some
kind of legal vacuum! The court's holding with regard to the inheritance tax is supported by a citation to an Oregon case, which in turn
squarely bases its decision on the doctrine of equitable ownership. 0This type of juggling is perhaps justified by a practical considerationthat of keeping our classification of property for purposes of probate
2"Dysart v. Colonial Fire Underwriters, 142 Wash. 601, 254 Pac. 240 (1927)

cited sup-ra note 9.
15Capital Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Convey, 175 Wash. 224, 27 P (2d) 136 (1933)Johnson v. Stalcup, 176 Wash. 153, 28 P (2d) 279 (1934)
16Vandin v. McCleary Timber Co., 157 Wash. 635, 289 Pac. 1016 (1930) cited
supra note 9.
17 In re School Districts 12 and 133. 141 Wash. 538, 251 Pac. 882 (1927)
18Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1801), cited supra note 4.
,I9n re Eilermann's Estate, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P (2d) 763 (1934)
20 In re Denmng's Estate, 112 Ore. 621, 229 Pac. 912 (1924)
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in accord with the classification adopted by other jurisdictions. But at

best it illustrates the unfortunate confusion to which the Ashford case
gave birth.
A few years subsequent to the Ashford decision an interesting holding of our court established that a vendor under an executory contract
to sell land who has assigned his interest in the contract has no property
in the land which can be taken by a trustee in bankruptcy to satisfy
the vendor's debt.2 The court said that the "vendor has only the
naked legal title to the property" This language smacks strongly of
that used by courts mvokng the doctrine of equitable ownership. It is
true that here there was not only a contract but also an assignment of
the vendor's contractual interest, but there was no parting with the
legal title and it would seem that the Ashzford language would dictate
a different result from that reached by our court. The case can only
be explained by finding the vendor to have only a security interest in
the land, an interest which could be assigned like any contractual right.
This explanation is of course repugnant to the Ashford case.
One of the few situations where the vendor has been accorded an
interest in realty which seems to be consistent with Ashford is that of
a statutory action to establish boundaries. It has been held that the
vendor is a necessary party to the suit." But tis result may be reached
without resort to the Ashford case and is not a refutation of our contention that the latter is no longer the law. For obvious practical
reasons it is inportant that the vendor be a party, for if he were not
the decision might not be binding upon him-a significant matter in
the event that the purchaser should default and the vendor recover
unincumbered title.
In summary, then, it appears that the vendor has considerably fewer
rights than the Ashford language would lead us to believe. If we except
the risk of loss cases, he has, under decisions subsequent to Ashford,
no clearly identifiable rights or liabilities other than those ascribed to
a vendor in other jurisdictions. Although the court continues to pay
lip service to the Ashford language, that language is not reflected, as
we have seen, in the substantive law.
Now let us turn our attention to the rights and liabilities of the
purchaser and ascertain whether the court has adhered to the Ashford
case in that field. Our court has found no difficulty in finding that the
21 Cuhmback v. Stevens, 158 Wash. 675, 291 Pac. 705 (1930)
22

Cady v. Kerr, 11 Wn. (2d) 1, 118 P. (2d) 182 (1941)
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purchaser has at least some rights: the right to acquire title, and where
the contract so provides the right to acquire and defend possession. 2
These rights are of sufficient substance that they may be attached for
debt under the Washington statute authorizing attachments on "real"
property 24 This result is rather apparently a contradiction of the
Ashford case, as was pointed out at the time. 5
It is now settled, moreover, that a purchaser can maintain an action
for trespass.2 - It might technically be argued that trespass, being a
purely possessory action, may be maintained by one who has no title
"either legal or equitable" in the land. But it is surely inconsistent to
permit an action in trespass to one who has, as the Ashford case asserted, no "interest" in the land. The court realized this and said that the
purchaser does have an interest in land.2" Only a failure to refer to the
case itself prevents this language from being a specific overturn of at
least a portion of the Ashford doctrine.
Another blow was struck at A sh ord by a decision that a purchaser is
a "proper" party to a condemnation proceeding." This is a half-hearted
overruling of the early case of Schaefer v. Gregory9 which found that
a purchaser need not be present at a condemnation proceeding because
he has no legal or equitable title to the land. The Schaefer case was
the lone citation given by the majority in the Ashford case, and a
weakening of its authority indirectly undermines the validity of the
later case. The undermining appears considerable when we regard the
illogic of holding that a person who has no "title or interest, either
legal or equitable" is nonetheless a proper party at a condemnation
proceeding.
Recent cases show an increasing reluctance to apply the Ashford
language. Characteristic is the holding that a purchaser is a property
23 Cf. Oliver v. McEachran, 149 Wash. 433, 271 Pac. 93 (1928), Daniels v. Fossas,
152 Wash. 516, 278 Pac. 412 (1929)
2' State ex rel. Oatey Orchard Co. v. Sup'r Ct., 154 Wash. 10. 280 Pac. 350
(1929), Epley v. Hunter, 154 Wash. 163, 281 Pac. 327 (1929) The statute concerned is REm. REV. STAT. (1932) § 659, which authorizes attachments on "real
property"
25 The concurring opinion in State ex rel. Oatey Orchard Co. v Sup'r Ct.,
154 Wash. 10, 280 Pac. 350 (1929), cited supra note 24.
28 Lawson v. Helmich, 20 Wn. (2d) 167, 146 P (2d) 537
(1944)
7Ibtd, With regard to the whole question of the purchaser's possessory
interest see: Kateiva v. Snyder, 143 Wash. 172, 254 Pac. 857 (1927); Peters v.
Bellingham Coal Mines, 173 Wash. 123, 21 P (2d) 1024 (1933)
28 State v. Wenatchee Valley Holding Co., 169 Wash. 535, 14 P (2d) 51 (1932)
112 Wash. 408, 192 Pac. 968 (1920)
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holder within the meaning of the irrigation district statutes." We are
again presented with the familiar post-Ashford pattern of inconsistency a purchaser has no "interest" but is a property holder I Another
recent case found that a purchaser has certain rights "annexed to and
exercisable with reference to" land which are sufficient to permit him to
defend, and possibly even to maintain, an action to quiet title.8" The
first question that comes to mind is how one can defend a title which the
Askford case specifically says he doesn't havel Yet the court goes on
to reiterate that the Ashford case is still good law in this state.
So we have a picture of the manner in which our court has tacitly
slipped out from under the Ashford case and in a large number of subsequent decisions has endowed the purchaser with all the attributes of
title which are conferred by the doctrine of equitable ownershnp. As wehave indicated before, the doctrine of equitable ownership is simply a
convenient expression for explaining the protection of the purchaser's
obvious equities in the land."3 It is the writer's contention that the court
has recognized these equities to an extent that is entirely incompatible
with a denial of the doctrine.
It was suggested in a concurring decision to the Aslford case that the
decision therein reached, while out of line and without sound analytic
basis, was yet so woven into the fabric of our real property law even at
that time that it must be affirmed for the sake of stability If this was
true at that time, it is certainly so no longer, for the court has made so
many exceptions that the principal rule exists now only in name. A
forthright repudiation of the language of Ashford v. Reese, msofar as it
rejected the doctrine of equitable ownership, would not only remove
numerous inconsistencies in the court's present position but would also
clear the atmosphere of our property law.
"I 're Horse Heaven Irrigation District. 11 Wn.(2d) 218, 118 P (2d) 972
(1941) The particular statute considered was REM. REV. STAT. (1932) § 7528,
which provides for irrigation district elections by such voters as "hold title
or evidence of title to land" in the district.
3
1,Turpen v. Johnson, 126 Wash. Dec. 674 (1946)
"Stone, Equitable Converston by Contract (1913) 13 COL. L. REV. 369.

THE 1943 WASHINGTON ARBITRATION ACT
Jomi C. BRAmw

I.
INTRODUCTION

Changes in the arbitration laws of the State 6f Washington effected
by the 1943 Act, can be expected to increase the effectiveness of written

